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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE SUBSTANTIVE EQUITY HISTORICALLY
APPLIED BY THE U. S. COURTS
By
HOWARD NEWCOMB MORSE*
The Constitution of the United States provides that, "The judicial power
shall extend to all cases, in law and equity. . " The Congress defined and
designated the equity referred to as follows: ". the forms and modes of pro-
ceeding in suits of equity . . . in the circuit and district courts shall be according
to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity . . except
when it is otherwise provided by statute or by rules of court made in pursuance
thereof; but the same shall be subject to alteration and addition by the said courts
. . . and to regulation by the Supreme Court, by rules prescribed, from time to
time, to any circuit or district court, not inconsistent with the laws of the United
States."2
In 1832 Mr. Justice Story in Boyle v. Zacharie$ construed the foregoing
"principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity" to mean the
principles, rules, and usages of the High Court of Chancery in England, stating
that the, ". . . doctrine of this court is, that the remedies in equity are to be ad-
ministered, not according to the State practice, but according to the practice of
courts of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from that of courts
of law; subject, of course, to the provisions of the acts of Congress, and to such
alterations and rules as in the exercise of the powers delegated by those acts, the
courts of the United States may, from time to time, prescribe." The following year
this interpretation was reaffirmed by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Vattier v.
Hinde,4 who declared that, "This act has been generally understood to adopt the
principles, rules and usages of the Court of Chancery of England." Six years later
this view was upheld by Mr. Justice Wayne in Story v. Livingston,5 who stated
that, "Where the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court to the circuit courts do not
apply, the practice of the circuit and district courts shall be regulated by the
practice of the High Court of Chancery in England." Two years later this con-
struction was restated by Mr. Justice Thompson in Gaines v. Relf,6 who stated
that where, "... those rules which the Supreme Court of the United States has
*LL.B., Tulane University; Member of the Bar of the State of Georgia; Secretary and Treasurer
of the Augusta Circuit Bar Association; Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago.
1 Const., U. S., Art. Il1, sec. 2, clause 1.
2 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. L. ch. 21, sec. 2, p. 93, R. S. sec. 913; Act of May 8, 1792,
1 Stat. L. ch. 36, sec. 2, p. 276, R. S. sec. 913; Act of May 19, 1828, 4 Stat. L. ch. 68, sec. 1, p.
278, R. S. sec. 992; Act of Aug. 1, 1842, 5 Stat. L. ch. 109, p. 499, R. S. sec. 992.
3 6 Pet. 658, 8 L. Ed. 532.
4 7 Pet. 274, 8 L. Ed. 675.
5 13 Pet. 359, 10 L. Ed. 200.
6 15 Pet. 15, 10 L. Ed. 642.
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passed to regulate the practice in the courts of equity of the United States . .. do
not apply, the practice of the circuit and district courts must be regulated by the
practice of the Court of Chancery in England."
The equity powers of the English Court of Chancery which are to be exer-
cised by the United States courts were said in Fontain v. Ravenel7 in 1854 to be
those, ".. .which the High Court of Chancery in England, acting under its judicial
capacity as a court of equity, possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation
of the Constitution of the United States," by Mr. Justice McLean, who three years
earlier had declared in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Birdge Co.8 that,
"The usages of the High Court of Chancery in England, whenever the jurisdiction
is exercised, govern the proceedings." He termed such usages "the common law of
chancery." The objctionability of such a designation may be best summarized by
quoting the following passage from the pleading addressed to the Supreme Court
of the United States nine years earlier by Mr. Dana, the attorney for the defendant
in Swift v. Tyson:9 "In coming together with their respective States, the framers
of the Constitution, and our representatives in Congress after them, must be re-
garded as having had in view the language, laws, and institutions of the States
which they represented. If, therefore, in the organization of the federal judiciary,
a system of laws is presupposed, it is the American law, which is now as distinct in
its character as the English or French."
Louisiana was admitted into the Union in 1812, the only state in which a
system of jurisprudence obtained not based upon the common law of England.
The law of Louisiana is, in the words of Mr. Justice Bradley in 1879 in Jackson
v. Ludeling,10 ". . . based upon the civil law." Yet five years earlier he stated in
The Lottawanna"l that, ". . the common law . . . is the basis of all the state
laws." In Jackson v. Ludeling he further declared that the civil law of Louisiana
is, ". . . not precisely as laid down in the compilations of Justinian, but as inter-
preted in the jurisprudence of France and Spain.... When Louisiana was acquired
by the United States in 1803, it had been a colony of Spain for more than thirty
years, except in the formal transfer to France at the time of our purchase; and the
Spanish law was the common law of the Territory until modified by subsequent
legislation. In 1808, the first Civil Code was adopted, based partly on the Spanish
Partidas and partly on the project of the Code Napoleon, the completed Code not
having yet been received. In 1825, the Civil Code was revised, and was made to
conform more closely to the French Code, often copying the phraseology."
In 1830, Mr. Justice McLean in his dissent in Parsons v. Bedford12 stated that,
"This system may be called the civil law of Louisiana, and is peculiar to that
7 17 How. 384, 15 L. Ed. 80.
8 13 How. 563, 14 L. Ed. 249.
9 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865.
10 99 U. S. 513, 25 L. Ed. 460.
11 21 Wall. 558.
12 3 Pet. 444, 7 L. Ed. 732.
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State." He explained his nomenclatural designation of the body of jurisprudence
of Louisiana thusly: "In the State of Louisiana the principles of the common law
are not recognized, neither do the principles of the civil law of Rome furnish the
basis of their jurisprudence. They have a system peculiar to themselves, adopted by
their statutes .... In thus repudiating the forms and principles of the common law,
the State of Louisiana has pursued a course different from her sister states. This
has resulted from the views of jurisprudence derived by the great mass of her
citizens from the foreign governments with which they were recently connected.
.. It is no doubt a wise policy to adapt the principles of government to the moral
and social condition of the governed. This is no less true in a judicial than it is in
a political point of view; and where an intelligent people possess the sovereign
power, they will not fail to secure this first object of a good government."
No courts of chancery exist, or ever have existed, in the state of Louisiana.
Neither is chancery jurisdiction possessed by the courts of that state. But the civil
law of Louisiana affords in the courts of that state relief substantially equivalent
in effect to the remedies extended by courts of chancery in England and in the
states of New Jersey, Delaware, Mississippi, Arkansas, Vermont, and Tennessee
and offered by the chancery jurisdiction of the courts of the forty-one other states
by virtue of the following provision of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "In all
civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and
decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural
law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent." 18 The phrase
"natural law and reason, or received usages" contained in the foregoing provision
was construed in 1918 by Mr. Chief Justice Monroe of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Osborn v. City of Shreveport'4 to include, ..... .the practice in the
courts of equity in this country and England." Eleven years later this interpretation
was reiterated by Mr. Chief Justice O'Niell of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in
Godfrey v. Ray15 to the effect that the phrase "natural law and reason, or received
usages" was deemed to include, "... the precedents of the courts of equity else-
where established."
Back in 1830 the fact that the civil law of Louisiana afforded in the courts
of that state relief substantially equivalent in effect to the remedies extended by
the equity which is the outgrowth of the common law was described by Messrs.
Livingston and Webster, the attorneys for the plaintiff in error in Parsons v. Bed-
ford, thusly, "In every possible case relief is given by a court of law in Louisiana,"
and by Mr. Justice McLean in his dissent in the same case as follows, "The modes
of proceeding in their (Louisiana's) courts are more nearly assimilated to the
forms of chancery than to those of the common law." Five years later in his dissent
in Livingston v. Story16 the same jurist stated that by "the peculiar mode of proce-
18 La. Civ. Code of 1870, Art. 21.
14 143 La. 932, -79 So. 542.
15 169 La. 77,,124 So. 151.
16 9 Pet. 632, 9 L Ed. 255.
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dure under the Louisiana practice ... an adequate remedy is given." In the same
case Messrs. Porter and Clay, the attorneys for the appellee, in their argumentation
addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States declared that: "The ordinary
courts of Louisiana are armed with the full powers of an equity tribunal. So true
is this, that the counsel for the appellant is challenged to show the slightest dis-
crepancy in any important particular; and it is believed that if any one of the court
were about to create a court of equity, not by a general reference to another system,
but by a special enactment, he would take the Louisiana statute as a model; or, if
he did not, his own legal accomplishments would induce him to draw up one in
all respects similar." However, Mr. Justice Thompson did not concur in this view
for six years later he stated in Gaines v. Relf that, "... parties to suits in Louisiana
have a right to the benefit of these (Federal equity) rules; nor can they be denied
by any rule or order, without causing delays, producing unnecessary and oppressive
expenses; and in the greater number of cases, an entire denial of equitable rights."
The courts of Louisiana are not, like the chancery courts of England and the
aforesaid six American states or the chancery jurisdiction of the courts of the
other American jurisdictions, limited either in the kind of relief or in the quantity
of relief which may be dispensed, as the civil law of Louisiana is free of the halter
of precedent and the reins of tradition characteristic of the equity known to the
common law, and is not, like the equity recognized by the common law, solidified
and consolidated, but is, rather, elastic and unfettered.
The equity jurisdiction of the United States courts in the several states has
repeatedly been held to be uniform, as evidenced by the words of Mr. Chief
justice Marshall in 1819 in United States v. Howland and Allen,1" ". . . the
courts of the Union have a chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the Judiciary
Act confers the same chancery powers on all and gives the same rule of decision.";
by the words of Mr. Justice Story in 1832 in Boyle v. Zacharie, "The chancery
jurisdiction given by the constitution and laws of the United States is the same in
all the states of the Union, and the rule of decision is the same in all."; by the
words of Mr. Justice Curtis in 1851 in Neves v. Scott,'1 "Wherever a case in equity
may arise and be determined under the judicial power of the United States, the
same principles of equity must be applied to it."; by the words of Mr. Justice
Swayne in 1862 in Noonan v. Lee,'9 "The equity jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States is derived from the Constitution and Laws of the United States.
Their powers and rules of decision are the same in all the States."; by the words
of Mr. Justice Davis in 1869 in Payne v. Hook,20 "The equity jurisdiction con-
ferred on the Federal Courts . . . is uniform throughout the different States of
the Union."; by the words of Mr. Justice Gray in 1885 in Watts v. Cameor3s,
17 4 Wheat. 115, 4 L. Ed. 526.
18 13 How. 272, 14 L. Ed. 140.
19 2 B. 509.
20 7 Wall. 430.
21 115 U. S. 353.
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"... .the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, under the
national Constitution and laws, is uniform throughout the Union."; by the words
of Mr. Justice Bradley in 1888 in Ridings v. Johnson,22 ". . . . the equity juris-
diction and remedies conferred by the laws of the United States upon its courts
... are uniform throughout the different States in the Union."; and by the words
of Mr. Justice Sutherland in 1923 in Mason v. United States,2 8 "That (equity)
jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must
be the same in all the states."
The fact that the chancery courts of some of those states in which such courts
exist have rules of equity differing from the rules of equity promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the United States for the government of the equity jurisdiction
of the United States courts or differing, in the event of lacunae in the rules of
equity formulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, from the rules held
by the High Court of Chancery in England, is not significant as such fact can in
no way impair the rule of uniformity of the equity jurisdiction of the United States
courts in the several States. This proposition was set forth in 1851 by Mr. Justice
Curtis in Russell v. Southard24 in the following terms: "It is suggested that a
different rule is held by the highest court of equity in Kentucky. If it were, with
great respect for that learned court, this court would not feel bound thereby. This
being a suit in equity, and oral evidence being admitted, or rejected, not by the
mere force of any state statute, but upon the principles of general equity juris-
prudence, this court must be governed by its own views of those principles.";
later in the same year by Mr. Justice McLean in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and
Belmont Bridge Co. in the following statement, ".... the courts of the Union
are not limited by the chancery system adopted by any state."; in 1862 by Mr.
Justice Swayne in Noonan v. Lee as follows: "The equity jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States is derived from the Constitution and Laws of the United
States. . . . Their practice is regulated . . . by rules established by the Supreme
Court. This court is invested by law with authority to make such rules. In all these
respects they are unaffected by state legislation."; in 1869 by Mr. Justice Davis
in Payne v. Hook as follows: "If legal remedies are sometimes modified to suit
the changes in the laws of the States, and the practice of their courts, it is not so
with equity. The equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Courts . . . is
subject to neither limitation or restraint by state legislation."; in 1885 by Mr.
Justice Gray in Watts v. Camors as follows: ".... the equity ... jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, under the national Constitution and laws . . .
cannot be limited in its extent, or controlled in its exercise, by the laws of the
several States."; in 1886 by Mr. Justice Matthews in McConih'ay v. Wright25 as
follows: ".... the jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States
22 128 U. S. 212.
.3 260 U. S. 545.
2 4 12 How. 139, 13 L. Ed. 927.
26 121 U. S. 201.
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as has often been decided, is vested as a part of the judicial power of the United
States in its courts by the Constitution and acts of Congress in execution thereof.
Without the assent of Congress that jurisdiction cannot be impaired or diminished
by the statutes of the several states regulating the practice of their own courts.";
in 1888 by Mr. Justice Bradley in Ridings v. Johnson as follows, ".... the equity
jurisdiction and remedies conferred by the laws of the United States upon its
courts cannot be limited or restrained by state legislation."; in 1892 by Mr. Justice
Brewer in Sheffield Farnace Co. v. Witherow2 6 as follows, ".... a state, by
prescribing an action at law to enforce even statutory rights, cannot oust a Federal
court, sitting in equity, of its jurisdiction to enforce such rights, provided they
are of an equitable nature."; and again the following year, at which time the ques-
tion was designated as "well settled" by Mr. Justice Brewer in Mississippi Mills
v. Cohn, 27 who stated that: "It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts, sitting as courts of equity, is neither enlarged nor diminished by state
legislation. Though by it all differences in forms of action be abolished; though
all remedies be administered in a single action at law; and, so far at least as form
is concerned, all distinction between equity and law be ended, yet the jurisdiction
of the Federal court, sitting as a court of equity, remains unchanged." However,
this question, even though described by Mr. Justice Brewer as "well settled" in
Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, presented itself to the Supreme Court of the United
States again thirty years later in Mason v. United States, in which case Mr. Justice
Sutherland stated: ".... the statutes of a state . . . may not be permitted to en-
large or diminish the Federal equity jurisdiction ...the power of the courts of
the United States to entertain suits in equity and to decide them cannot be abridged
by state legislation."
The fact that, even in 1812 when Louisiana became a State, no courts of
chancery existed in that State is not in itself important, there being other States
in which this condition also obtained, as such fact could in no wise modify the
rule of uniformity of the equity jurisdiction of the United States courts in the
several States according to Mr. Chief Justice Taney in 1850 in Bennett v. Butter-
worth28 in the following words: ". . . . as there is no distinction in its (Texas')
courts between cases at law and equity, it has been insisted in this case, on behalf
of the defendant in error, that this court may regard the plaintiff's petition either
as a declaration at law or as a bill in equity. Whatever may be the laws of Texas
in this respect, they do not govern the proceedings in the courts of the United
States. ... the State practice must not be understood as confounding the principles
of law and equity, nor as authorizing legal and equitable claims to be blended
together in one suit. The Constitution of the United States, in creating and defin-
ing the judicial power of the general government, establishes this distinction be-
tween law and equity." This interpretation, identical even to the particular state
26 149 U. S. 574.
27 150 U. S. 202, 37 L. Ed. 1052.
28 1I How. 674, 13 L. Ed. 859.
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involved, was reiterated in 1939, having been expressed in that year by Judge
Sibley in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap29 in the following language: "We have
here not a case where a Texas statute has created the right asserted, or has created
a presumption, or is in any manner to be applied as construed in Texas. The ques-
tion is simply what is the proper practice in courts of equity. The practice followed
in the State courts of Texas, where equity courts as such do not exist, is not con-
trolling." In 1851 Mr. Justice McLean stated in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and
Belmont Bridge Co. that, ". . . the courts of the Union... exercise their functions
in a state where no court of chancery has been established."
The foregoing construction was severely criticized in 1874 by Mr. Justice
Bradley in Hornbuckle v. Toombs 0 as follows: ". , . . it is well known that in
many states of the Union the two jurisdictions (law and equity) are commingled
in one form of action. And there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent such
a mode of proceeding. Even in the circuit and district courts of the United States
the same court is invested with the two jurisdictions, having a law side and an
equity side; and the enforced separation of the two remedies, legal and equitable,
in reference to tht same subject matter of controversy, sometimes leads to interest-
ing exhibitions of the power of mere form to retard the administration of justice.
In most cases it is difficult to see any good reason why an equitable right should
not be enforced or an equitable remedy administered in the same proceeding by
which the legal rights of the parties are adjudicated." Yet this same interpretation
was described as "settled" fourteen years later by the same jurist in Ridings v.
Johnson in the following terms, "And it is settled law that the courts of the United
States do not lose any of their equitable jurisdiction in those States where no such
(chancery) courts exist; but, on the contrary, are bound to administer equitable
remedies in cases to which they are applicable, and which are not adapted to a
common law action,"
Yet despite the finality of the foregoing statement by Mr. Justice Bradley,
the same question confronted the Supreme Court of the United States four years
later in Scott v. Armstrong,81 in which case Mr. Chief Justice Fuller held that,
.legal nd equitable claims cannot be blended together in one suit in the
circuit courts of the United States." The same question arose as recently as 1939
in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunla[p, in which case Judge Sibley stated that: "The
procedure in equity cases has always been governed by a practice uniform over
thee United States and independent of that in the State courts. This was held proper
in federal courts in Louisiana where as in Texas there are no separate courts of
equity." Judge Sibley's comparison of Texas to Louisiana in reference to the equity
jurisdiction of the United States courts to be exercised in those two States is valid
only insofar as neither State possesses courts of chancery. At this point the com-
29 101 F.2d 314.
80 18 Wall. 652.
81 146 U. S. 512.
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parison abruptly ends as the courts of Texas afford the equity which is collateral
to the common law while the courts of Louisiana do not extend the equity of which
the common law is cognizant but do dispense relief substantially equivalent in
effect thereto.
In some of those states in which no courts of chancery exist, in the words
of Mr. Justice Todd in 1818 in Robinson v. Campbell, 2 ". . . . courts of law
recognize and enforce, in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which
a court of equity would recognize and enforce." This fact, however, is of the
utmost significance for if the rule of uniformity of the equity jurisdiction of the
United States courts in the several states is capable of sustaining an exception there-
to, said fact would contribute to the citation of such exception.
Six years subsequent to the admission of Louisiana into the United States,
the question, up to that time only theoretical in scope, as to whether the equity
which is an appendage to the common law would obtain in the United States
courts in the one state in the Union in which both the common law and the equity
recognized by the common law were unfamiliar, became of practical importance
to Louisiana by virtue of the decision in Robinson v. Campbell, but only indirectly
since this case did not arise from Louisiana. Mr. Justice Todd held that the fact
that in some of those States in which no courts of chancery exist, ".... courts of
law recognize and enforce, in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which
a cout of equity would recognize and enforce," is not such as to constitute an
exception to the aforestated rule of uniformity. The reason assigned by Mr. Justice
Todd for this ruling, namely, that "A construction ... that would adopt the state
practice in all its extent, would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction," is valid on its face only insofar as it pertains to some of
those states where no courts of chancery exist in which, "... all relief is denied,
and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere nullities at law."
The express reason assigned for the holding, therefore, is overly inclusive as, "A
construction . . .that would adopt the state practice in all its extent," is not neces-
sary since a construction that would adopt the State practice in only part of its
extent, namely, that part constituted in some of those States in which no courts of
chancery obtain by the courts of law therein recognizing and enforcing, ".... in
suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would
recognize and enforce," would in no wise, .... extinguish, in such states, the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction."
Twenty-three years subsequent to the admission of Louisiana into the United
States and seventeen years subsequent to the opinion in Robinson v. Campbell, the
question as to whether the equity which was necessitated by the constriction of the
common law would prevail in thL United States courts, resident in Louisiana where
both the common law and the equity which is an enlargement thereof were un-
82 3 Wheat. 212, 4 L Ed. 372.
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recognized, became of direct practical significance to Louisiana as a result of the
decision in Livingston v. Story, a case which arose from the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana and th- first case involving this
problem originating in Louisiana. This case involved not only one of those States
where no courts of chancery obtain in which ".... courts of law recognize and
enforce, in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity
would recognize and enforce," as a contributing factor to the establishment of an
exception to the rule of uniformity of the equity jurisdiction of the United States
courts in the several States, but also, for the first time, the gravamen of the
proposition for the recognition of such exception, namely, the system of civil law
of Louisiana, to which both the common law and the equity extensive of the com-
mon law are foreign but which nevertheless affords relief substantially equivalent
in results to the remedies which the equity incident to the common law avails.
Therefore, if Livingston v. Story were to create an exception to such rule of uni-
formity, the exception would pertain only to the United States courts sitting in
Louisiana as the said gravamen is exclusive of that State.
Robinson v. Campbell, decided six years subsequent to the admission of
Louisiana into the United States, and Livingston v. Story, handed down twenty-
three years subsequent to such admission, both constitute cases of first impression
insofar as the system of civil law of Louisiana is concerned, differing in their
practical application to, and in their consequent effects on, such system, the former
consisting of the contributing cause heretofore referred to and influencing certain
States directly but bearing on the system of civil law of Louisiana only indirectly,
the latter comprising the gravamen previously mentioned as well as the aforesaid
contributory cause and affecting such system directly.
Mr. White, the attorney for the appellant in Livingston v. Story, addressed
the Supreme Court of the United States in his argumentation as follows: "Congress
have as much power to declare that any other provision of the Constitution shall
be dispensed with, or suspended in any State of this Union, as to enact that the
judicial power of the District Court of Louisiana shall not extend to cases in
equity: and the equity referred to has been construed by this court to be that
system we borrow from the parent country; in other words, that good, old,
conscientious, honest system . . . as understood and practiced in England." What
semblance of justification had this attorn'ey to refer to England as the parent
country in reference to Louisiana? Nevertheless, this same unfounded reference
was made fifty-eight years later by Mr. Justice Brewer in Mississippi Mills v. Cohn
as follows: "The inquiry ... is, whether by the principles of common law and
equity, as distinguished and defined in this and the mother country at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the relief here sought
was one obtainable in a court of law, or one which only a court of equity was
fully competent to give." Two years later this same unreasonable reference was
SUBSTANTIVE EQUITY HISTORICALLY APPLIED
made by Mr. Justice Shiras in Lindsay v. First National Bank of Shreveport3 as
follows: "The case is thus brought within the rule, which this court has so often
had occasion to lay down, that the remedies in the courts of the United States are,
at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts, but ac-
cording to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined
in that country from which we derive our knowledge of these principles." The
latter two cases arose from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western
District of Louisiana. In the last three cases herein mentioned, all of which orig-
inated in Louisiana, the Supreme Court. of the United States reversed the United
States judges in Louisiana.
Messrs. Porter and Clay, the attorneys for the appellee in Livingston v. Story,
in their pleadings before the Supreme Court of the United States cautioned that
highest of all tribunals in the following manner: "It is understood that the ques-
tion in this case is, whether the common law, and the equity forms of proceeding,
shall be introduced into Louisiana. You cannot introduce the chancery law unless
you introduce the common law, and if this is done it will produce great dissatis-
faction in that State." This warning is reminiscent of that given to the Supreme
Court of the United States five years earlier by Messrs. Livingston and Webster,
the attorneys for the plaintiff in error in Parsons v. Bedford-the former attorney
being the appellee in Livingston v. Story five years later, in these words: "To
introduce the practice of the common law into any of the courts established in
that State (Louisiana), would be against the feelings and wishes of the whole
people of the State. . . .The position of anyone who should come from a State
where the common law is not known, as from Louisiana, and who should be re-
quired to argue a cause on the common law alone, in this court, would be extra-
ordinary. The principle that no relief shall be given in equity where there is a
plain rem'edy at law, would interfere materially with proceedings in the courts of
Louisiana. In every possible case relief is given by a court of law in Louisiana; and
the distinction between law and equity is not there known. To insist on the estab-
lishment of the distinction in the courts of the United States there, would be
productive of grievous injury. It would give a foreigner one rule of practice and
a citizen another. . . .If the forms of the common law must be pursued ...the
distinction between proceedings at law and in equity, must be established there.
This will be productive of great inconvenience, and . . . other injurious effects."
Messrs. Porter and Clay stated that: "It is a singular question whether a
system of jurisprudence exists in a State where it is not known or understood.
Whether, in a community where the civil law prevails, a system of laws shall be
introduced which are against their prejudices. The Constitution was formed at a
time when the common law prevailed in all the States which then composed the
Union." This observation is reminiscent of that made five years earlier by Mr.
83 156 U. S. 493, 39 L. Ed. 505.
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Justice Story in Parsons v. Bedford in these words: "At this time (at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution) there were no States in the Union the basis of
whose jurisprudence was not essentially that of the common law in its widest
meaning; and probably no States were contemplated in which it would not exist."
The last quoted passage apparently reveals that Mr. Justice Story assumed lack of
foresight on the part of the framers of the Constitution.
Messrs. Porter and Clay further stated that in the original thirteen States
there must, ". . . have been chancery law, for it is a part of the common law; and
in reference to this state of things, in all those States there were recognized and
established a chancery and a common law jurisdiction, and the principles and
rules of courts of common law and courts of chancery. The third section of the
third article shows that the Constitution did not introduce those principles, and
those modes of proceedings. It found them existing, and provided for their ad-
ministration. The terms of the Constitution are 'all cases of law and equity arising
under the Constitution.' The difference between law and equity, requiring dif-
ferent tribunals for their application to cases, exists in no other country but in
England and the United States. Our proposition is that there can exist no equity
law but where the common law prevails. In those States they are distinguishable
from each other, although part of the same law, and these distinctions are con-
sidered a part of the common law; and different courts enforce these different
systems. But in Louisiana these distinctions do not exist. To talk of distinguishing
law and equity, is as reasonable there as to state that equity and equity differ."
But despite the invincible logic constituting justification for the creation of
an exception to the rule of uniformity of the equity jurisdiction of the United
States courts in the several States which would apply only to Louisiana and the
flawless employment of such logic by Messrs. Porter and Clay, Mr. Justice Thomp-
son in Livingston v. Story refused to permit the establishment of such exception,
overruling the decision of the judge of the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Louisiana and ruling adversely to the contention of Messrs.
Porter and Clay, all three of the latter gentlemen being, unlike Mr. Justice Thomp-
son, experts in the system of civil law of Louisiana. It might have been well had
the members of the Supreme Court of the United States left this question to be
determined exclusively by the United States judges in Louisiana who, for the most
part, were educated and trained in the civil law rather than in the common law,
the members of the Supreme Court of the United States, with the exception of Mr.
Justice White, having been instructed in the common law. The extreme practical
importance of this consideration was attested to by the words of wisdom written by
Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co.
v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.,84 "I do not know whether...
we should regard ourselves as authorities upon the general law of Louisiana superior
84 276 U. S. 518, 72 L Ed. 681.
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to those trained in the system." It is unfortunate that Mr. Justice Holmes' ad-
monishment to his fellow members of the Supreme Court of the United States and
to that Court as thereafter might be comprised was not proferred until eighty-three
years subsequent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson in Livingston v. Story.
Mr. Justice Thompson summed up his decision in these words: "The sufficiency
of the objections, therefore, must turn upon the general question whether the
District Court of Louisiana has, by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
the same equity powers as a circuit court of the United States has in the other
States of the Union; and we think it has . . . such equity powers must be exercised
according to the principles, rules and usages of the circuit courts of the United
States, as regulated and prescribed for the circuit courts in the other States of the
Union." It is interesting to note that both Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr. Edward
Livingston, the appellee in Livingston v. Story, were born in New York, were
educated in New Jersey, and became legal scholars of recognized eminence, the
comparison capable of being extended no further as the former attained standing
as one of the most prominent authorities on the common law while the latter rose
to the rank of the most illustrious proponent of the system of civil law of Louisiana.
The problem posed by, and ostensibly settled by, Livingston v. Story presented
itself again three years later in Poultney v. City of Lafayette,3 6 Mr. Chief Justice
Taney upholding the view of Mr. Justice Thompson and reversing the judge of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The same
problem confronted the Supreme Court of the United States twice the following
year, first in Story v. Livingston, decided by Mr. Justice Wayne, and then in
Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney,3 6 decided by Mr. Justice Story. Mr. Justice Thomp-
son's view was reiterated by both of these jurists, the latter overruling the judge
of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana
and the former stating that: ". . . those rules which the Supreme Court of the
United States has passed to regulate the practice in the courts of equity of the
United States ... are as obligatory upon the courts of the United States in Louis-
iana as they are upon all other United States courts. . . The parties to suits in
Louisiana have a right to the benefit of them; nor can they be denied by any rule
or order, without causing delays, producing unnecessary and oppressive expenses,
and in the greater number of instances, an entire denial of equitable rights." The
last sentence is in diametric conflict with the following passage in Mr. Justice
McLean's dissent in Livingston v. Story: "The peculiar mode of procedure under
the Louisiana practice preserves, substantially, the same forms in affording a
remedy in all cases ... by this mode of proceeding an adequate remedy is given."
Two years later the identical problem arose for a fifth time in Gaines v. Reif, a
case which reached the Supreme Court of the United States on certificate from
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The
86 12 Pet. 474, 9 L. Ed. 1161.
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organ of the Court was again Mr. Justice Thompson who, as might be expected,
reaffirmed the view he had expressed six years earlier in Livingston v. Story and
which had been shared by Mr. Chief Justice Taney three years earlier in Poultney
v. City of Lafayette and by Mr. Justice Wayne and Mr. Justice Story two years
earlier in Story v. Livingston and Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney respectively. Mr.
Justice Thompson stated in Gaines v. Reif that: ". . . those rules which the
Supreme Court of the United States has passed to regulate the practice in the courts
of equity of the United States ... are as obligatory upon the courts of the United
States in Louisiana, as upon all other United States courts. . . . The various cases
which had been before the court, involving substantially the same question, in re-
lation to the States where there were no equity State courts . . . were referred to;
and the uniform decisions of this court have been that there being no equity State
courts did not prevent the exercise of equity jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States. And it was accordingly decided that the District Court of Louisiana was
bound to proceed in equity causes according to the principles, rules, and usages,
which belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished from courts of common
law,"
Thus, in both Livingston v. Story in 1835 and in Gaines v. Reif six years
later, Mr. Justice Thompson made no distinction whatsoever between the United
States in which no courts of chancery exist on the one hand and Louisiana and
certain other States in which no courts of chancery exist but in which, ". .. courts
of law recognize and enforce, in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights
which a court of equity would recognize and enforce," on the other hand. In fact,
Mr. Justice Thompson did not even distinguish between the States in which no
courts of chancery exist to dispense the equity which is a projection of the common
law but in which such courts ofchancery could exist on the one hand and Louisana,
where no courts of chancery obtain, but where such courts of chancery could not
obtain inasmuch as the civil law prevails in that State, and the equity which is
collateral to the common law is unfamiliar to the civil law. Yet in the face of such
irrefutable conditions and unimpeachable facts, Mr. Justice Thompson in Gaines
v. Reif termed the cases arising from the United States courts in those States in
which no courts of chancery exist, even including among such States those States
in which, ". . .all relief is denied, and such equitable claims and rights are to be
considered as mere nullities at law," and the cases arising from the United States
courts in Louisiana as, ". .. involving substantially the same question."
If Mr. Justice Thompson had decided the issue embodied in Livingston v.
Story in 1835 correctly, in all probability that same issue would not have confront-
ed the Supreme Court of the United States subsequently as it did. The following
excerpt from the opinion in Gaines v. Relf sounds indicative of apprehension on
the part of Mr. Justice Thompson, to whom had fallen the unique task of determin-
ing the problem twice, lest the question present itself again to the Supreme Court
of the United States even afttr Gaines v. Reif. "These questions having been so
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repeatedly decided by this court, and the grounds upon which they rest so fully
stated and published in the reports, that it is unnecessary, if not unfit, now to treat
this as an open question." Thus, the question was officially designated as closed
in 1841 in Gaines v. Relf by the Supreme Court of the United States speaking
through Mr. Justice Thompson.
However, even though the question was formally described as no longer an
open one in 1841 by Mr. Justice Thompson in Gaines v. Relf, nevertheless ten
years later the precise question plagued the Supreme Court of the United States
for the sixth time in Bein v. Heath,87 in which case Mr. Chief Justice Taney for
the second time upheld the view twice announced by Mr. Justice Thompson-he
having done so thirteen years previously in Pottney v. City of Lafayette, reversed
the judge of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, and stated that: "And when an injunction is applied for in the Circuit
Court of the United States sitting in Louisiana, the court grants it or not, according
to the establish'ed principles of equity, and not according to the laws and practice
of the State in which there is no court of chancery, as contradistinguished from a
court of common law."
Later in the same year, in Neves v. Scott, a case involving a similar problem
but not originating in Louisiana, Mr. Justice Curtis ruled that the principl-s of
equity, "... . may make part of the law of a state, or they may have been modified
by its legislation, or usages, or they may never have existed in its jurisprudence."
The last phrase obviously referred to Louisiana by implication as that state is the
only jurisdiction in the United States where the principles of the equity which is an
elongation of the common law are unknown. Mr. Justice Curtis further stated
that: "Instances of each kind may be found in the several states. But in all the states,
the equity law, recognized by the Constitution and by Acts of Congress, and
modified by the latter, is administered by the courts of tht United States, and
upon appeal by this court."
Thirty-two years later the exact question arose for determination by the
Supreme Court of the United States for the seventh time in Ellis V.. Davis,88 in
which case Mr. Justice Matthews upheld the view twice expressed by both Mr.
Justice Thompson and Mr. Chief Justice Taney and declared that, "It has been
often decided by this court that the terms 'law' and 'equity,' as used iii the Con-
stitution are . intended to mark and fix the distinction between the two systems
of jurisprudence as known and practiced at the time of its adoption." But how
could a distinction fixed in 1789, when the Constitution of the United States went
into effect and thereby affected only eleven states, have applied to Louisiana,
which jurisdiction did not become a state until twenty-three years later? This
sophistry is reminiscent of the opinion twenty-nine years earlier in Fontain v.
87 12 How. 178, 13 L. Ed. 939.
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Ravenel, in which case Mr. Justice McLean held the equity powers of the English
Court of Chancery to be exercised by the United States courts to be those, "...
which the high court of chancery in England, acting -under its judicial capacity as
a court of equity, possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation of the
Constitution of the United States." This illogical proposition was advanced ten
years after Ellis v. Davis by Mr. Justice Brewer in Mississippi Mills v. Cohn thus-
ly, ". .. the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined
in this and the mother country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of
the United States."
Two years after Ellis v. Davis the same question presented itself for adjudica-
tion by the Supreme Court of the United States for the eighth time in Watts v.
Camors, a case which arose from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Louisiana in which Mr. Justice Gray reiterated the view twice
presented by Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr. Chief Justice Taney, stating that,
1... the equity. . jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, under the na-
tional Constitution and laws, is uniform throughout the Union, and cannot be
limited in its extent, or controlled in its exercise, by the laws of the several States."
Three years later, in 1888, the foregoing question confronted the Supreme
Court of the United States for the ninth time in Ridings v. Johnson, in which case
Mr. Justice Bradley followed what had become by that time a series of precedents
by overruling the judge of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana and stating that: "The fact that an action of nullity lies in
such a cage in Louisiana does not vary the matter. Such an action lies there because
there are no courts of equity in that State; all suits are actions at law; but, in the
nature of things, if full justice is to be done, some of these actions must admit of
lines of inquiry, and methods of relief which, under the English system, would
be proper for a suit in equity. And it is settled law that the courts of the United
States do not lose any of their equitable jurisdiction in those States where no such
courts exist; but, on the contrary, are bound to administer equitable remedies in
cases to which they are applicable, and which are not adapted to a common law
action." Thus, a question was officially designated as "settled" in 1888 by Mr.
Justice Bradley in Ridings v. .Johnson which had been described by Mr. Justice
Thompson with equal formality as one, "... unnecessary, if not unfit, now to
treat ... as an open qu'estion," forty-seven years earlier in Gaines v. Relf and which
had arisen from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana for adjudication by the Supreme Court of the United States three times
during the interim. Mr. Justice Bradley further stated in Ridings v. Johnson that:
"Thus, an equitable title or an equitabla defense, though allowed to be set up in
a state court, cannot be s't up in an action at law in the same State in the federal
courts, but must be made the subject of a suit in equity. . . We have distinctly
held that the equity jurisdiction and remedies conferred by the laws of the United
States upon its courts cannot be limited or restrained by state legislation, and are
uniform throughout the different States of the Union."
SUBSTANTIVE EQUITY HISTORICALLY APPLIED
Five years after Ridings v. Johnson the familiar question arose for the tenth
time, despite Mr. Justice Bradley's designation of the question as "settled" five
years earlier. Mr. Justice Brewer in Mississippi Mills v. Cohn reaffirmed what
might be termed "the Thompson-Taney view," reversed the judge of the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana-the sixth time
the Supreme Court of the United States overruled a United States court in Louis-
iana on this question, and declared that: "It is well settled that the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, is neither enlarged nor diminished
by state legislation. Though by it all differences in forms of action be abolished;
though all remedies be administered in a single action at law; and so far at least as
form is concerned, all distinction between equity and law be ended, yet the juris-
diction of the Federal court, sitting as a court of equity, remains unchanged." Thus
what had been described as "settled" in 1888 by Mr. Justice Bradley in Ridings
v. Johnson was promoted to the designation of "well settled" by Mr. Justice Brewer
in Mississippi Mills v. Cohn five years later.
Although variously described as one, ". . . unnecessary, if not unfit, now to
treat . . . as an open question," in 1841, as""settled" in 1888, and as "well settled"
in 1893, nevertheless thirty years after Mississippi Mills v. Cohn the question
reached the Supreme Court of the United States for the eleventh time in Mason
v. United States, a case which arose from the District Court of the United States
for the Western District of Louisiana in which Mr. Justice Sutherland expounded
the Thompson-Taney view by declaring that state: ". . . statutes may not be permit-
ted to enlarge or diminish the Federal equity jurisdiction. . . . That jurisdiction is
conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must be the same
in all the states ... the power of the courts of the United States to entertain suits
in equity and to decide them cannot be abridged by state legislation."
The fact that the Supreme Court of the United States was requested to de-
termine, and did determine, the question on ten separate subsequent occasions
which it had presumably determined in Livingston v. Story would seem to indicate
a prevalence of the belief on the part of the citizens of the State of Louisiana that
Mr. Justice Thompson's and Mr. Chief Justice Taney's view was unsound. The de-
termined course of resistance met by the Thompson-Taney view over a period of
eighty-eight years, from Livingston v. Story to Mason v. United States, vouchsafes
to the correctness of the following prediction made by Messrs. Porter and Clay in
Livingston v. Story should the Supreme Court of the United States adjudicate as
it did: "It is understood that the question in this case is, whether the common law,
and the equity forms of proceeding, shall be introduced into Louisiana. You can-
not introduce the chancery law unless you introduce the common law, and if this
is done it will produce great dissatisfaction in that State."
